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OF FALSE TEETH AND BITING CRITIQLTES: 
JONES v. FISHER IN CONTEXT 
Regina Austin* 
A working knowledge of the critiques and resistance tactics of 
ordinary workers can provide a powerful tool for challenging the 
conventional wisdom that is at the core of the legal analysis 
supporting their economic subordination. An analysis of Jones v. 
Fisher, 1 a 1969 Wisconsin Supreme Court decision that I found in 
the first-year torts book I once used/ provides an excellent 
illustration of the point. It demonstrates the usefulness of the 
technique of critically placing legal conflicts in socio-economic 
context with an eye toward discerning the various and competing 
cultural perspectives of the litigants. 
Contextual analysis of opinions is a variant of cultural studies. 
Culture is a mechanism through which a community of people 
organize and make sense of their lives against a backdrop of 
material circumstances. Cultures with their socially derived and 
therefore arbitrary conventions and habits are constant! y in a state 
of flux, responding to both internal and external forces. Cultural 
studies explore the competition among and within cultures, with 
particular attention being paid to the ways in which certain ideas 
come to be accepted by some communities as common sense and 
rejected by others as utter nonsense. Contextual/cultural studies, 
then, would suggest that the reader of an opinion consider the 
social, political, and economic status of the parties; the power 
dynamic that exists among them; the identities of any parties 
whose interests are being adjudicated without their participation 
or representation; the impact of cultural and material conditions 
in shaping the dispute; the role of individual agency, including 
* ©Copyright 1999 Regina Austin. 
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organized political activism, in producing the conflict or possibly 
resolving it; the sources of knowledge and information underlying 
the parties' positions; the narrative and rhetorical tools each party 
possesses; the way in which each party's position is constructed 
as common sense or otherwise legitimated; and the impact of the 
outcome on the social, economic, or political subordination or 
domination of the competing parties. . 
The basis of the cause of action in Jones v. Fisher was assault 
and battery. The contours of assault and battery vary with the 
social context. An assault and battery arises when one makes 
contact with the person of another with the intent to harm or the 
intent to offend and/or without the other's consent. 3 Offense is 
gauged by the appropriateness of the touching given the time and 
place. Consent may be implied from the circumstances as well. 
Acts, silence, or inaction will suffice if such behavior would be 
understood by a reasonable person as intended to indicate 
permission. Moreover, "[i]n determining whether conduct would 
be understood by a reasonable person as indicating consent, the 
customs of the community are to be taken into account." 4 The 
potential for cultural conflict, for dual readings of an interaction, 
for alternative sightings of the operative norm are apparent in this 
simple statement of doctrinal rules. 
The social complexities of the tort of assault and battery are 
revealed in an unusual way in Jones v. Fisher. Jerome and Clara 
Belle Fisher, the defendants, were the owners of a nursing 
home.5 The plaintiff was Aleta Jones, a 26-year old woman who 
entered the defendants' employ as a nurse's aid in December of 
1966.6 Plaintiff's chores were somewhat domestic in nature. 
3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 (1983). This section provides: 
(1) Consent is willingness in fact for conduct to occur, It may be 
manifested by action or inaction and need not be communicated to 
the actor. (2) If words or conduct are reasonably understood by 
another to be intended as consent, they constitute apparent consent 
and are as effective as consent in fact. 
!d. 
4 !d. at cmt. 9. 
5 Jones, 42 Wis. 2d at 212, 166 N.W.2d at 177. 
G fd. 
I 
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"'She cared for the home residents during the night hours, set up 
and gave medication, prepared and served breakfast and had 
some clean-up duties in the kitchen." 7 The plaintiff and 
defendants had a cordial and friendly relationship. The Fishers 
regarded Mrs. Jones "as a good employee and were personally 
fond of her. "8 
In September of 1967, plaintiff was told by her dentist that she 
needed dentures. 9 The Fishers voluntarily loaned her $200 to 
apply toward her dental expenses. 10 Shortly after obtaining the 
dentures, plaintiff quit. 11 When she went to collect her last pay 
check, Mrs. Fisher attempted to convince her to return to work 
for the Fishers, but plaintiff refused. 12 Then plaintiff and Mr. 
Fisher discussed repayment of the loan. Plaintiff's offer to pay 
off the debt at the rate of $20 per month was rejected by Mr. 
Fisher who demanded that the loan be repaid in three days or that 
the upper plate be left as security. 13 Plaintiff rejected these terms 
and an argument ensued. When plaintiff attempted to run from 
the room, Mr. Fisher grabbed her about the arms, grasped her 
about the face, and extracted the false teeth from her mouth.14 
"The affray [lasted] less than 15 minutes." 15 Mrs. Fisher went to 
the police station and reported the incident. An officer went to 
the nursing home, obtained the dentures, and returned them to 
Mrs. Jones at the station. 16 
Mr. Fisher's forcible removal of the dentures caused Mrs. 
Jones some pain to her arms and back and to her mouth which 
was sensitive because the plate did not fit properly. 17 The harm 
Mrs. Jones suffered was largely psychological - the humiliation, 
7 !d. 
8 !d. 
9Id. at 2 13, 166 N.W.2d at 177. 
10 ld. 
11ld. 
12 !d. 
13 !d. 
14 ld. 
IS fd. 
16 !d. at 2 14, 166 N.W.2d at 177. 
17 !d. at 213, 166 N.W.2d at 177. 
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embarrassment, and shame of being attacked in the way in which 
she was, of appearing in public without her teeth and having to 
go to the police to get them retrieved. 18 Mrs. Jones, however, 
did not go to the doctor or take any prescription medicines for her 
upset.19 
A jury awarded Mrs. Jones $ 1,000 compensatory damages and 
$5,000 punitive damages.20 The issue on appeal was not the 
merits of the judgment in favor of Mrs. Jones but the amount of 
the recovery. 21 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin concluded that 
Mrs. Jones had been given too much. It reduced the 
compensatory damages to $50022 and the punitive damages to 
$2,000,23 and ordered her to pay the costs of the appeal. 24 
The majority of the Supreme Court concluded that the 
compensatory damages were excessive. The assault took only a 
few minutes and Mrs. Jones "was without her teeth for, at most, 
an hour. "25 Moreover, "[h]er symptoms were all subjective and 
not supported by any medical testimony nor any other 
corroborating evidence. "26 (This conclusion, it should be noted, 
may merely reflect the widely prevalent suspicion of claims for 
emotional trauma not accompanied by physical injury or 
manifested in overt physical suffering.) The majority had no 
doubt that the Fishers' behavior was sufficiently "illegal, 
outrageous and grossly unreasonable" to warrant the punishment 
of an award of punitive damages. 27 That the defendants were 
operating under the erroneous assumption that they were entitled 
to take the teeth as security or collateral for their loan did not 
excuse their conduct. The $5,000 punitive damages award, 
however, represented a fifth of their yearly earnings and a 
18/d. at 2 14, 166 N.W.2d at 177-78. 
19/d. 
20 !d. 
21 !d. at 2 15, 166 N.W.2d at 178. 
22 !d. at 2 18, 166 N.W.2d at 180. 
23 !d. at 220, 166 N.W.2d at 18 1. 
24 !d. at 222, 166 N.W.2d at 182. 
25 !d. at 2 16, 166 N.W.2d at 180. 
26 !d. 
27/d. at 2 19, 166 N.W.2d at 180. 
I 
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seventh of their net worth. Considering "the wealth of the 
defendants, the character and extent of their acts, and the 
probable motivation, and then applying the standard of 
punishment and deterrence," $2,000 was a reasonable 
assessment. 28 
The dissenting judge, who would have denied Mrs. Jones 
punitive damages altogether was both blunt and sarcastic in 
categorizing the altercation between Mrs. Jones and the Fishers. 
In the view of the dissenter, the case involved an isolated incident 
of a petty sort, "the most trivial of altercations and the mildest of 
scuffles. "29 He likened the assault on Mrs. Jones to a "toupee­
snatching " and equated "the unpleasantness of an hour spent 
without newly acquired dentures ... [to] an hour spent without 
the adornment of a substitute headpiece. "3° Compensatory 
damages were therefore sufficient to deter the Fishers and others 
from seizing dentures as security for an unpaid loan unless the 
court was "dealing here with a propensity to grab, and hold upper 
plates that is marked either by a high rate of recidivism or 
contagion. "31 Mrs. Jones, for her part, was an ungrateful 
employee who left the service of the Fishers with a $200 debt 
undischarged. "The bicuspid corpus delicti [was] present only 
because of an interest-free loan made by defendants to plaintiff " 
on the expectation that she would remain in their employ. 32 The 
loan thus bespoke "goodwill, not illwill. "33 "It was the lady's 
decision, loan unpaid, to go to work for someone else that 
precipitated a change in the relationship. " 34 The "flareup of 
emotions, this shift in mood, this disappointment of expectations 
on the part of the employing couple " which lead to the fracas 
were neither wanton nor reckless and could not be the foundation 
for an award of punitive damages. 35 
28 /d. at 220, 166 N.W.2d at 18 1. 
29 /d. at 225, 166 N.W. 2d at 184 (Hansen, J. dissenting). 
30 Id. at 222, 166 N.W.2d at 182 (Hansen, J. dissenting). 
31 /d. at 223-24, 166 N.W. 2d at 183 (Hansen, J. dissenting). 
32 /d. at 225, 166 N. W. 2d at 183 (Hansen, J. dissenting). 
33 /d. (Hansen, J. dissenting). 
34 /d. (Hansen, J. dissenting). 
35 Id. (Hansen, J. dissenting). 
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Today, we might see the opinion in Jones v. Fisher as 
presenting another example of gender and possibly race bias in 
the courts; the undervaluation of the pain and suffering 
experienced by female and/or minority plaintiffs has been 
documented and explained. Apart from any role that gender and 
race may have played in the case, the judges' myopia almost 
certainly had a basis in the widespread assumptions about the 
proper roles of employers of domestic help and their servants. 
It is possible to assess Mrs. Jones' claim from the perspective 
of domestic workers, much like herself, who were engaged in 
struggles, at roughly the same time, with their employers over the 
right to greater respect and renumeration. In 1985, sociologist 
Judith Rollins published a wonderful ethnographic study of the 
relationship between black domestics and their white employers 
that provides useful insights into the assault on Mrs. Jones. The 
analysis that follows draws heavily on Rollins' book, Between 
Woman: Domestics and Their Employers. 36 
The personal kindness and generosity the Fishers showed Mrs. 
Jones were at least as instrumental and manipulative as they may 
have been selfless and philanthropic. The Fishers were not 
atypical employers of low-status help in that respect. The 
psychological and emotional bond that existed between the 
Fishers and Mrs. Jones reinforced the Fishers' superiority and 
facilitated their economic exploitation of Mrs. Jones. This was a 
relationship between people of unequal status. Given the nature 
of the work, its situs, the prevalence of females as the principal 
supervisor, and the significance women attach to personal 
feelings and the quality of their relationships, it is not surprising 
that domestics consider the treatment they receive from their 
employers a significant aspect of the job. Female employers in 
turn understand the power of emotional rewards and punishments 
and use it as a mechanism for controlling domestic workers. In 
extending themselves, the Fishers were attempting to solidify 
their power over Mrs. Jones. They tried to capitalize on the 
female bonding and to pull the emotional strings by having Mrs. 
36 JUDITH ROLLINS, BETWEEN WOtv!EN: DOi\iESTICS AND THEIR EMPLOYERS 
(1985). 
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Fisher attempt to persuade Mrs. Jones to return to work. 37 \Vhen 
that effort failed, the male partner took control, the topic turned 
to money, and the coercion became overt, physical, and violent. 38 
The Fishers' use of force and violence should not have been 
viewed as a response to acts of provocation and betrayal on the 
part of Mrs. Jones, but to the frustration of the Fishers' sense of 
mastery and domination over her person and their use of 
prerogatives employers of domestics have long appropriated for 
themselves. For example, under normal circumstances, there are 
rules of spatial deference that keep the domestic employee at a 
physical distance while privileging the employer to initiate bodily 
contact with the employee. 
The loan to Mrs. Jones was supposed to reinforce her economic 
inequality and dependence on the Fishers and her subordinate 
status. Of course, the court found nothing wrong with this and 
gave the Fishers credit for being magnanimous and benevolent. 
Instead of looking at the loan as charity, however, the court 
might have considered it as being in lieu of a raise. There was no 
reason to assume that Mrs. Jones did not earn what she got from 
her employers. Mrs. Jones was perhaps too poor to pay for her 
dentures without a loan from her employers because she was not 
being paid enough; that she found employment elsewhere may 
evidence that fact. The failure to seek medical attention and the 
consequent absence of medical testimony to substantiate her 
claims of distress may also be attributed to her limited income. 
The loan was supposed to represent the Fishers' concern for 
Mrs. Jones, and if Mrs. Jones was not really grateful she was 
supposed to act that way by remaining in the Fishers' employ. 
The court refused to recognize that Mrs. Jones' departure and the 
subsequent assault on her person exposed these role expectations 
to be pure fantasy. If the Fishers were truly concerned about her, 
they would have been happy that she obtained a better job. It 
must have been galling for the Fishers to have realized that their 
loan made Mrs. Jones more nearly their equal. It gave her 
leverage with which to bargain with them. Mrs. Jones turned her 
37 Jones, 42 Wis. 2d at 2 13, 166 N.W.2d at 177. 
38 !d. 
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loan that was supposed to solidify the Fishers' power over her 
into a device for her own liberation. The Fishers' possessiveness 
of Mrs. Jones extended beyond any ownership interest they 
thought they had in her false teeth. They could not forcibly 
reclaim the worker, so they did the next best thing; they forcibly 
reclaimed her dentures. 
The Fishers' behavior, then, was all too familiar to minority 
women who performed domestic service work in homes of 
various sorts. The court should have saved its pieties for more 
deserving defendants and dealt with the systematic social and 
economic realities that underlay the defendants' conduct. 
The court gave no hint that Mrs. Jones' claim fit into a larger 
context. There was no suggestion that her suit related to any 
systematic wrong that should have triggered the common law's 
concern with general deterrence. Unable or refusing to identify a 
pattern of abuse or a category of claimants whose widely 
experienced distress ought to be seen as possessing an aura of 
objectivity, the court diminished and belittled plaintiff's suffering 
as idiosyncratic, subjective, and inconsequential. 
The very language the dissenter used went even further. The 
dissent's rhetoric assured that the plaintiff's claim would not be 
taken seriously. He treated the altercation as a laughable affair, a 
bit of a lark, the stuff of bedroom comedies. What is there about 
ill-fitting rugs and teeth in a jar that provokes such laughter? Is it 
their associations with old age, or the loss of virility and sexiness, 
or the bad luck of ill health and substandard medical care? Of 
course, there is a world of difference between being deprived of 
one's toupee and being deprived of one's false teeth. How could 
the dissenter have counted on his readers failing to see the 
difference? Though hair, fake or otherwise, is no laughing 
matter to most black women who understand its relationship to 
self-representation and confidence, a toupee is still largely 
cosmetic. Though the loss of a toupee is likely to be 
embarrassing, the loss of one's false teeth is likely to be far 
worse. False teeth improve one's ability to speak and to eat. 
Their absence causes the face to collapse and lose its contours. 
In my limited experience, people without their false teeth tend to 
garble their words or put their hands over their mouths. I suspect 
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a toothless person in a struggle with her bosses is like a toothless 
argument, "lacking in sharpness, or bite," "lacking the means of 
enforcement or coercion: futile, ineffectual. 'd9 
Jones v. Fisher was decided in 1969. Some things have 
changed since then but arguably not enough. Domestic workers 
today are less likely to be native-born blacks and more likely to 
be immigrants from Central and South America, the Near East, 
the Indian subcontinent, and the Caribbean. The Civil Rights 
Movement made it harder for white employers to treat black 
female domestics as social inferiors, while at the same time it 
opened up employment opportunities for black women in more 
remunerative occupations. Domestic work is one of the fields in 
which female immigrants, both legal and illegal, have secured a 
niche. Much domestic work still occurs largely in the informal 
economy where the requirements of the minimum wage law and 
fair labor standards act do not prevail and social security taxes 
are rarely paid and income taxes are rarely withheld. 
Today's domestics are less politically empowered than the 
black domestics of Mrs. Jones' time. The success of the movie 
adaptations of the play "Driving Miss Daisy"40 and the novel 
"Remains of the Day "41 attest to the tenacity of the myth of the 
generous master and the grateful/faithful servant. The knowledge 
with which to challenge the myth exists, but it is no more 
empowered than the workers themselves; they are in no position 
to turn employer-saints into exploiter-villains or rebellious 
servants into worker-heroes in the eyes of the law or the public. 
Many of those who might give the critique greater visibility and 
clout are operating under handicap. I do not think that it is unfair 
to suggest that where domestic service work is concerned, the 
cutting edge of some of the most progressive antiracist, pro­
feminist counterideologies may be dulled by self-interest. 
Applying Rollins' critique to the Jones case may strike many 
readers as harsh and unfair. People who have hired domestics 
39 WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2409 (Philip Babcock et 
a!. ed. , 1993). 
40 ALFRED UHRYS, DRIVING MISS DAISY ( 1988). 
41 KAZOU lSHIGURO, REMAINS OF THE DAY (1989). 
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and people who have benefited from their paid caregiving may 
reject Rollins' challenge to the generosity of the gift giving that 
domestics' employers do or the genuineness of the heartfelt 
intimacy employers and domestic employees seemingly share. 
Those with first-hand experience of the domestic employment 
situation may doubt the intensity of the tensions Rollins describes 
and suspect that she is simply putting her own gloss on the 
relationship. Middle-class feminist professionals like myself who 
are dependent on the assistance and loyalty of domestic workers 
to maintain the home front while they pursue challenging, stress­
filled employment like men do, may not be the most objective 
assessors or advocates of a pro-domestic critical world view. 
Our deconstruction of doctrinal rubrics and attack on the 
mechanisms by which they are manipulated to maintain existing 
power relations may have worked too well. Our understanding of 
knowledge and of power has been skewed in a way that has made 
the insight linking the two the source of a conservative analysis. 
It has doubled back on us and rendered our criticism impotent. 
Our own inclusion in the camp of the oppressed privileges us to 
employ the techniques of liberation on our own behalf. We 
classify ourselves among those whose ordeals should be taken 
account of when we advocate that the lived experience of 
minority peoples be accorded the respectability of "knowledge." 
We have lost sight of the fact that knowledge is a social product 
or have equated the bourgeois experience of racism with the 
whole. We do not always situate ourselves with reference to 
other races, ethnicities, gender, or classes. In addition, there is 
no basis for concluding that the lived experience of one person is 
superior to that of another. Given their instrumental quality, our 
claims of truth, merit, freedom, and even justice cannot help but 
be suspect. 
"Politics" can be a substitute for knowledge rather than 
knowledge being a necessary tool in a program of transformative 
politics. "Knowledge" can be abstracted from the social 
practices of ordinary black people and become something that one 
gains by being black and living a "political" existence within the 
confines of one's institution or in the broader realm of the 
profession. There is too little curiosity about the actual lives of 
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subordinated minority people, let alone systematic study. 
Recognition that black people are not monolithic, of course, 
would interfere with claims that we all speak \vith a different 
"voice" or that the race or ethnicity of a scholar can make a work 
of scholarship on the subject of white supremacy more 
''authentic." 
Legal scholars must return to the task of critical social inquiry. 
The knowledge required for the practice of trans formative politics 
can only be acquired by an exploration of the neglected particular 
so as to problematize for all what is now only a predicament for 
some. There must be pragmatic engagement with those who 
know material and social insecurity first hand. Both systems that 
subjugate and the social and individual agents that cooperate in 
producing that subjugation must be studied. At the same time, 
the claims for the knowledge that is lived experience and narrow 
political activity must give way to a bit of transcendent theorizing 
and some immanent power accumulation. 
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